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Abstract 
 
From la Migra to el Amigo: The INS’ Campaign to Befriend 
Undocumented Immigrants during IRCA  
 
Luis Antonio Romero Jr., M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisor:  Nestor Rodriguez 
 
Before the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the 
relationship between undocumented immigrants and the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) was highly antagonistic. Undocumented immigrants were distrustful of the 
immigration service due to its deportation mission that implemented deceitful tactics, 
which included using immigrant children to lure their undocumented parents and sending 
letters to immigrants promising legalization only to deport them once they arrived to INS 
offices among many others. However, this changed for a brief period after the passage of 
IRCA when INS transformed its image in the eyes of immigrants and became their amigo 
– their friend. INS accomplished this by engaging in a furious public relations campaign 
and training their staff to be supportive of immigrants as they applied for legal status – 
unprecedented measures for an agency that was set on deporting immigrants. Immigrants 
began to trust INS and went to them for help to get legalization during IRCA, something 
that experts thought would be impossible. While the literature on IRCA has studied its 
legislative history, short-term effects and long-term impact, it has overlooked the central 
 vi 
question this study analyzes: why did INS implement unprecedented measures to help 
undocumented immigrants attain legalization? Using congressional hearings on INS, 
interviews and public statements made by INS officials, institutional evaluations of 
IRCA’s implementation, news articles and secondary data, I show that INS was going 
through a legitimation crisis, meaning that Congress and other overseeing institutions 
questioned INS’ effectiveness and management leading to stagnation in INS’ growth, 
something INS wanted to change. Implementing the legalization component of IRCA 
successfully was one way in which INS could regain its standing in the eyes of Congress, 
which meant helping immigrants attain legal status. In other words, the interests of 
immigrants and INS converged during IRCA leading to a change in INS’ behavior. To 
understand this process, this study shows how INS went from being la migra 
(immigration services) to el amigo of undocumented immigrants during IRCA.  
 
 vii 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ...........................................................................................................x 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................ xi 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................1 
Organizational Legitimacy ..............................................................................5 
Theories on Government Agency's Behavior ...............................................10 
A Look Ahead ...............................................................................................13 
Chapter 2: Methodology and Data .........................................................................15 
Method ..........................................................................................................15 
Operationalization of Concepts .....................................................................19 
Data..... ..........................................................................................................20 
Chapter 3: Background on IRCA and INS ............................................................23 
IRCA and INS in the Literature ....................................................................23 
INS: Formation and Administrative Change ................................................26 
INS: Leadership and Hierarchy During IRCA..............................................29 
IRCA's Legislative History ...........................................................................32 
Chapter 4: The INS' Image Crisis ..........................................................................36 
Troubled Perceptions from Above: GAO, OMB and Congress ...................37 
Troubled Perceptions from Below: Immigrant Advocacy Groups and 
Undocumented Immigrants ..................................................................44 
Chapter 5: Becoming El Amigo and Regaining Legitimacy ..................................49 
Befriending Immigrants: The PR Campaign, Establishing Legalization Offices 
and Creating a New Image ...................................................................50 
Praise from Above: The Relegitimization of the INS ...................................5! 
Chapter 6: Conclusion............................................................................................61 
INS, IRCA and the Convergence of Interests ...............................................61 
Contemporary Relevance for the Literature .................................................63 
Directions for Future Research .....................................................................64 
viii 
A Final Thought ............................................................................................66 
Bibliography ..........................................................................................................68 
 ix 
List of Tables 
Table 3-1:  Administrative History of Immigration Agencies in the United States, 
1817- Present ....................................................................................28 
Table 4-1:  INS Budget Requests, Appropriations and Rates of Change, Fiscal Years 
1969-1984 .........................................................................................42 
Table 5-1:  Immigration and Naturalization Service's Budget, 1975-2003 .........59 
x 
List of Figures 
Figure 3-1: INS Organizational Chart ....................................................................30 
xi 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
“[INS is] the ugly stepchild of the Justice Department.” 
-Alan Nelson, Former Federal Commissioner of INS (quoted in 
Magaña 1995: 86) 
 
Undocumented immigrants had great distrust for the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). While the entrance of immigrants at Ellis Island has 
become a romantic moment in United States history, this has not been the reality lived by 
immigrants of color in the last 60 years – especially when considering the creation of the 
“illegal alien”1 (Johnson 1996/1997; Ngai 2004). INS, while in charge of both 
naturalization services and enforcement, concerned itself primarily with the enforcement 
aspect of the job as it relates to dealing with undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. 
(Purtell 1986). They implemented various unethical tactics to earn its negative image in 
the eyes of immigrants which included using immigrant children to lure their 
undocumented parents and sending letters to immigrants promising legal status only to 
deport them once they arrived at INS offices. These tactics caused undocumented 
immigrants to see INS as an enforcing entity that they could not trust (INS 1988; Cosco 
1988).  
However, this changed for a brief period during the late 1980’s after the passage 
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. This immigration law, 
while containing two provisions that increased enforcement against undocumented 
migration, also provided a legalization provision, known as amnesty or amnestia by the 
1 I will refer to this group of people as “undocumented migrants” or “undocumented immigrants” from this 
point forward. 
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Spanish-speaking migrants who were the primary targets of the law. There were two 
legalization programs under IRCA. The first was the general legalization program (I-687) 
which lasted for a one year period from May 5, 1987, to May 4, 1988. Any immigrant 
who entered the U.S. before 1982 was eligible for this program. The second program 
under IRCA was the Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) program aimed at legalizing 
farmers and other agricultural workers which lasted from June 1, 1987, to November 30, 
1988. Legalization2 was to be funded completely by the application fees paid by the 
migrants seeking legalization – meaning that INS would not receive any additional funds 
or profit as a result of these legalization efforts.  
The passage of IRCA was a contentious endeavor, but it was not more difficult 
than having to implement it, the responsibility falling on INS. When combining the 
distrust between migrants and INS, INS’ poor management and leadership structure 
(GAO 1973, 1991) and INS having no incentive to enact extraordinary measures to 
promote legalization, legalization was expected to fail (Hing 1992). To make matters 
worse, INS was not fully prepared to deal with the expected number of potential 
applicants – very liberal estimates (by those who oppose undocumented immigrants) 
predicting that there would be an upward of 12 million applicants, even though the true 
number was closer to 3 million applicants with 2.7 million receiving legalization (Hing 
2004). However, INS’ implementation of legalization was a large success from start to 
2 Legalization and amnesty are not always synonymous with one another in how they are used in the 
literature. Legalization can mean a required participation in English and civic training to get a green card 
while amnesty is known as the legal pardon for being in the U.S. without authorization. However, no 
distinction is made in this study – they are used interchangeably to mean a legal pardon for being in the 
U.S. without authorization. Any references to civic training will be called civic training, not legalization.  
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finish – INS undertook extraordinary measures to promote legalization and gained the 
trust of undocumented immigrants (GAO 1990; Gordon 1988; Creppy 1988). They did so 
by engaging in a furious public relations campaign that rebranded their image, 
transforming them from la migra (the Spanish name for immigration services) to el 
amigo (a friend) – something that neither INS had ever done before or has been replicated 
since (Magaña 2003). Yet, INS’ efforts during IRCA have often been overlooked by 
scholars who have studied IRCA and INS. Why did INS implement unprecedented 
measures to help undocumented immigrants attain legalization? Moreover, how did the 
INS become el amigo of undocumented immigrants – something that was thought to be 
impossible (Hing 1992; Magaña 2003)? 
Many will point to the law itself as the explanation to these questions, but there 
are two factors that make this an unlikely possibility. The first, as mentioned above, is 
there was no significant monetary incentive in IRCA for INS to carry out legalization 
effectively. While the application fees would eventually pay for the expenses of the INS’ 
efforts during legalization, these fees did not serve as a profit for the INS and their then 
dismal funding – they were to break even at best (IRCA 1986; U.S. Congress 1988). If 
they were unsuccessful, they would have been blamed for their failures, but could have 
blamed Congress for producing a faulty law that made it impossible to succeed. 
Secondly, the legalization program was not the “heart” of IRCA – the sanctions provision 
(and to a lesser extent, the increased border protections) was the driving force behind 
IRCA. INS could have potentially failed to help immigrants as much as they did and still 
covered themselves in the eyes of Congress and anti-immigrant Americans if they 
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showed progress in regards to sanctions against employers and their beefed up border 
patrol. In other words, INS could have survived any backlash without the legalization 
program (thus putting undocumented immigrants in a bind) as long as they focused on the 
other two provisions of IRCA.  
Nevertheless, INS wanted to do more than just survive without backlash. Like any 
agency, organization, or institution, it wants to prosper and expand (Browne 1980). This 
was especially true of the INS who had been seen by Congress and many others at the 
federal level as inadequate. This has been well documented in the history of INS by 
Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) (GAO 1973, 1987, 1990; Morris 1984). In one report, Congressional 
members described INS as “inadequately equipped, overwhelmed by its work, deeply 
demoralized, and in a hopeless state of disarray” (Morris 1985: 88). This meant that INS 
had a problem - a perception problem. More specifically, INS had a legitimacy3 problem 
in the eyes of Congress and undocumented immigrants – neither believed in the job INS 
was doing. Congress, along with other major U.S. institutions like GAO and OMB, all 
felt that INS was poorly managed and could not complete many of the tasks that 
Congress asked of it (GAO 1973, 1987, 1990; Morris 1984). Congress’ troubled 
perception of INS would prevent it from growing, as it was denied many of the budget 
requests that it asked for (Morris 1984). In order for the INS to find a way to survive and 
expand beyond its past failures, it had to be perceived and accepted as an efficient and 
3 Legitimacy is used in terms of its emphasis on social perceptions rather than the legal conception that is 
often used when thinking of governments or government agencies. I do not argue that INS was viewed as 
non-legal, but rather, that its competency and morality were questioned by Congress and immigrants, 
respectively. A fuller discussion of this is found later in this chapter and in chapter 2.  
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useful entity – it had to be seen as legitimate – and the only way to be legitimate was to 
help undocumented immigrants attain legalization during IRCA.  
Yet, on a structural level, the end goal was not about helping migrants, but 
changing INS’ image in the eyes of immigrants as a means to change its image in the 
eyes of Congress so it could get an increase budget and more responsibilities – so it could 
expand. In other words, the interests of immigrants (legalization) and INS (desire to 
change its image for Congress in order to expand) converged during this historical 
moment. Thus, it becomes clear why INS took the extraordinary measures to help 
immigrants and the process it undertook to do so. 
Organizational Legitimacy  
The study of legitimacy has a longstanding tradition within sociology, particularly 
in social psychology, organizational sociology and studies on states and their stability 
(Habermas 1975; Johnson et al 2006). While these three major paradigms focus on 
different actors and levels of analysis when discussing legitimacy, all three regard it as a 
process that explains behaviors by groups, organizations and states (Johnson et al 2006)4. 
Because INS is a governmental organization, the social psychology literature on 
legitimacy will not be discussed at length, rather focusing on the literature of 
organizations and states. Still, many of the contributions made by social psychology can 
be found in how other approaches which study legitimacy (Johnson et al 2006). Before 
analyzing the literature, it is important to have a working definition of legitimacy. 
4 For those interested in a fuller discussion on social psychology, organizations and legitimacy, an in-depth 
reading of Johnson et al (2006) will provide the reader with a thorough understanding of legitimacy in these 
fields.  
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Sociological studies of legitimacy date back to the days of Max Weber (1978 
[1924]). Weber states that something is legitimate “only if action is approximately or on 
the average oriented to certain determinate ‘maxims’ or rules” (31). According to 
Johnson et al (2006), Weber’s definition of legitimacy “offers the central insight that 
legitimation occurs through a collective construction of social reality in which the 
elements of a social order are seen as consonant with norms, values and beliefs that 
individuals presume are widely shared, whether or not they personally share them” (55). 
In other words, legitimacy is something that is granted by a collective (not individuals) 
and abides by the norms and values of that collective. Organizational sociology has been 
heavily influenced by Weber’s initial conception of legitimacy. This is seen in 
Suchman’s (1995) formulation of legitimacy in organizations. He writes that legitimacy 
is a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs 
and definitions” (574). The important takeaway from Weber’s original conception of 
legitimacy and Suchman’s refined definition that suits organizations is that legitimacy is 
above all else a perception that is managed by the collective. This means that there can be 
dissenters or people who view organizations or other entities as illegitimate, but it 
ultimately is irrelevant as long as the desired group believes that the organization is 
legitimate.  
Research on legitimacy and organizations has focused on legitimacy as a process 
– how new social objects acquire legitimacy and how this can explain organizational 
behavior. Johnson et al (2006) believe that there are four components that new 
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organizational forms must meet in order to be considered legitimate: innovation, local 
validation, diffusion and general validation (53). Whenever a new organization is formed, 
it must create something that satisfies a need in a way that either has never been satisfied 
or satisfied in a more efficient manner. If the innovation fulfills the need, then it gains 
local validation – meaning that it is consistent with the beliefs, values and norms of that 
community (Suchman 1995). This becomes the new, “acceptable way of doing things to 
meet local needs and goals” (Johnson et al. 2006: 60). From there, an innovation reaches 
diffusion whenever it spreads to other communities. This requires the innovation to pass 
through the local validation stage again (for it must be validated in order to be legitimate) 
and once multiple communities begin to accept the innovation, then its diffusion is 
complete. The final stage to legitimacy is general validation, which can be attained once 
the innovation has received validation across multiple settings and contexts and has come 
under the belief that it is acceptable and becomes part of the community’s culture (61).  
Johnson et al. (2006) illustrate how legitimacy works as a social process in their 
discussion of DiMaggio’s (1982) study of the emergent nonprofit arts organization in 
Boston. In the late 1800’s, there weren’t any organizations that were able to house art. 
For-profit organizations were mainly concerned with garnering large audiences, focusing 
most of their attention on theaters and concerts. This coupled with the entrance of 
immigrants and the emergence of the nouveaux riche created nonprofit organizations for 
art, such as the Museum of Fine Arts (MFA) and the Boston Orchestra (BSO) – the 
nonprofit art organizations representing the innovation. Accordingly, the MFA and BSO 
both succeeded in Boston (local validation) and after their success in Boston, other areas 
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of the country began to adopt the nonprofit organizational form as their own (diffusion). 
The final stage arrived (general validation) came once colleges and universities began to 
accept this type of art and it reflected in their curriculum (Johnson et al 2006).  
Going through the legitimation process and receiving legitimacy allows 
organizations that were once in danger of not being accepted into a community’s culture 
gain stability. As part of this stability, organizations have leeway in how their 
organizations are run without the immediate threat of losing their legitimacy. One of the 
consequences to having stability and legitimacy is that this can lead to inefficient policies 
and practices. The work of Walker & Zelditch (1993; Zelditch and Walker 1984) show 
that legitimacy grants organizations the power to retain that legitimacy within the 
organization because of the ability to enforce sanctions to those working within the 
organization. The manner in which this operates across organizations has also been 
studied by DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Dobbin et al (1993); Sutton and Dobbin (1996); 
Kelly (2003). In these instances, policies and practices become diffused and legitimated 
to other organizations, better known as institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). 
However, much of the literature on legitimacy – while strong and apt at 
describing how organizations gain legitimacy and the effects of legitimacy both within 
and across organizations – does not explain how organizations deal with the threat of 
delegitimization. Legitimacy, like any other form of capital, can be taken away – it is not 
eternal. Organizations that have been legitimated are able to maintain that legitimacy 
through various means as noted above, but this does not explain how organizations can 
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lose legitimacy or handle situations in which it is threatened – what Habermas would call 
a legitimation crisis.  
This, however, does not mean that governments and government agencies are 
synonymous with one another. While government agencies are part of the government, 
they are not as permanent as the ruling government itself – if a government agency is 
disbanded, this does not mean the government itself is disbanded. Also, while an existing 
agency is dependent on the government for its survival, it is not completely controlled by 
the government. As criminology literature has taught us, discretion is present in 
government agencies and is one of the most prevalent features of the criminal justice 
system, from the law enforcers who have discretion in how laws are implemented to the 
court system in which prosecutors and judges control indictments, plea bargains and 
sentencing (Inciardi 2010).  
With discretion, the federal government cedes some of its control to agencies and 
the people who operate them. Because of this discretion, government agencies are able to 
be studied independently of the government – having their own interests, motives, and 
strains to deal with. In most instances, “the government” is represented by Congress since 
members of Congress are in charge of the laws that these agencies are supposed to 
implement. They are also the ones who regulate the budgets of these agencies. However, 
as noted in the example of law enforcement and the court system, government agencies 
have discretion to combat Congress’ control over them. In other words, this can be seen 
as the separation between government and government agency – the autonomy of the 
government agencies. One of the advantages to studying INS is that it is a government 
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agency and will allow us to understand how it deals with a legitimation crisis. By 
understanding how INS gained the trust of immigrants and why they did so, we can 
understand how government agencies regain legitimacy and gain more insight into the 
motives behind this route of re-legitimization.  
Theories on Government Agency’s Behavior 
Why do government agencies behave the way they do? This has been the central 
question surrounding the study of government agencies and their behavior – practices, 
policies and regulation. While my discussion on the autonomy of government agencies 
argues that government agencies have some degree of separation between themselves and 
Congress (the representative of “the government” in this instance), there are theories on 
government agencies that argue the opposite. For example, Weingast and Moran (1983) 
state that agencies do not have autonomy, but rather that Congress and its committees 
“possess sufficient rewards and sanctions to create an incentive system for agencies” 
(769). According to this view, also known as Congressional control or Congressional 
dominance, agencies want the awards that Congress has to offer them and therefore, acts 
in the interest of Congress. They use the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as a case to 
study the level of influence that Congress has and find that congressional preferences, 
especially subcommittee preferences were significant factors in how the FTC chose 
which cases to handle (Weingast & Moran 1983: 780). Another perspective that theorizes 
the relationship between government agencies and Congress argues that while Congress 
does posses awards and sanctions that can influence the behavior, actions and practices of 
agencies, government agencies have autonomy given their complexities and own power 
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in handling their duties. Moe (1985) argues that a government agency’s knowledge of its 
own practices and organization allow them to exercise discretion – not being under 
complete “domination” like Weingast and Moran suggest. In his study of the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), Moe comes to the conclusion that while Congress, the 
courts and even the president had an influence on the NLRB, they ultimately did not 
affect its policies (1114).  
However, both theories have a nonreciprocal conception of the relationship 
between Congress and the government agency they seek to study. In their formulations, 
government agencies only respond or interact with Congress (or a branch of government 
higher than agencies in Moe’s formulation of the NLRB). By doing so, they overlook the 
role that other groups can have on government agencies – primarily, the masses. While 
these first two theories overlook this part of the equation, public-interest theories and the 
external-signals model take into consideration the role of the people and put it at the 
forefront of analysis. For instance, the public-interest theory of regulation argues that 
agencies take into consideration the benefits that the public stand to gain (wanting to 
maximize thesis benefits). Baron and Besanko (1984) suggest that there is an ongoing 
relationship between the regulation and the consumer. Stigler (1971) and Peltzman 
(1976) have a similar perspective to that of Baron and Besanko, except both of these 
projects study the relationship between government agencies and the industries they seek 
to regulate – what they both call capture theory. According to capture theory, government 
agencies behave in ways that maximize the benefits of the industries that they are 
regulating.  
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Another theory that studies the dynamic between government agencies and the 
people they serve (be it industries or the public) is external-signs theory. This theory, first 
used by Joskow (1974), Noll (1985), and Magat et al (1986), argues that government 
agencies need positive feedback from an outside group in order to avoid obstacles that 
may disrupt the agency’s operations (Olson 1995). According to Olson, “[c]omplaints 
about agency decisions or agency behavior can lead to congressional oversight, 
investigations, or other outside attempts by interest groups to intervene in agency 
operations” (1995:388). In order to avoid these interventions by Congress or interest 
groups, government agencies seek positive feedback to allow their operations to go 
uninterrupted. Moreover, positive feedback grants government agencies political support, 
allowing an agency to “shelter itself from changing political environments and 
[maintaining] its autonomy” (389).  
With the exception of external-signs theory, the literature on government agency 
behavior has a narrow conception of what influences an agencies’ behavior. The 
congressional dominance theory and its alternative by Moe (1985) suggest that the only 
influencing group that exists for agencies lies in the government, forgetting about the 
public. On the other hand, public-interest theory and capture theory both argue that it is 
the subject under regulation (the public, industries, etc.) that affect how agencies behave, 
diminishing the role of Congress and other entities that are superordinate to themselves. 
The compromise between these two types of theory is external-signals theory, which 
accounts for Congress’ power over an agency, the agencies autonomy from Congress, 
and an agency’s desire to receive positive feedback from the public in order to avoid 
12 
interventions from Congress. By making this turn, not only does external-signs theory 
converge with legitimacy theory, it expands it when discussing government agencies 
because it captures the balance agencies must strike between Congress and the public. 
Positive feedback in the external-signs theory is analogous to the positive perception the 
public has whenever an organization’s actions fall in line with a community’s norms and 
beliefs as Suchman described.  
Both of these theories, however, assume that the outside group (the public) which 
provides legitimacy/positive-feed back is legitimate, i.e. has the power to provide 
legitimacy to the organization at hand. Undocumented immigrants are the exact opposite 
of a legitimate group; they are viewed as illegitimate people (best seen in the moniker, 
“illegal alien”). By making this assumption, both the literatures of legitimacy and 
government agency behavior miss (1) that organizations and agencies have the power to 
grant legitimacy to the people (not just the people to the organizations) and more 
importantly, (2) that these illegitimate audiences can ultimately have an effect on the 
legitimacy of organizations – as was the case during IRCA. The implicit assumption of 
the literature on legitimacy and government agencies assumes that only legitimate agents 
can affect the positive feedback or legitimacy that organizations can receive. As I will 
show in this study, “illegitimate” people can also have an effect on governments and its 
agencies.  
A Look Ahead 
 The following chapters show why INS helped immigrants during IRCA. Chapter 
2 is a comprehensive methods section, outlining the historical method that will be used 
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for this study, the operationalization of key concepts and a discussion of the primary and 
secondary documents that are used as data. Chapter 3 provides a history of the INS (its 
formation, duties and functions) and IRCA (its beginnings at the state level, the political 
controversy behind legalization and employer sanctions and its signing into law). A brief 
overview of what previous scholars have said about INS and IRCA will also be included. 
Chapter 4 outlines the legitimation crisis that INS was going through, facing criticism by 
Congress, GAO and OMB. This was coupled by the distrust that immigrants and 
advocacy groups had for INS. I will argue that INS needed IRCA to be successful just as 
much as immigrants needed INS to implement it. Chapter 5 shows how INS took 
unprecedented measures to ensure its legitimacy during IRCA and how those 
unprecedented measures were successful and led to INS’ expansion in the coming years. 
This chapter shows how an organization can be re-legitimated through a process that is 
similar to the initial legitimation process. Finally, chapter 6 provides a conclusion of the 
study, a discussion of the implications for studies of organizations and legitimacy, and 
avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2:  Methodology and Data 
 
“Sociological explanation is necessarily historical. Historical sociology is thus not some 
special kind of sociology; rather, it is the essence of the discipline.” 
      – Philip Abrams (1982:2) 
 
Method 
 
Historical sociology has been at the heart of sociology since its inception. Even 
though sociology has shifted towards quantitative methods and large data sets, the 
foundational thinkers of sociology (such as Augustus Comte, Emile Durkheim, Karl 
Marx, Max Weber and W.E.B. Du Bois) all employed historical methods to explain 
social phenomenon in different societies. This is usually thought of as the first wave of 
historical sociology, one in which questions of modernity were the primary focus 
(Charrad 2006: 351).  The second wave that came in the 1970’s and 1980’s sought to 
respond to Marx and Weber, focusing on building theories of state, class and politics 
(352). Moreover, the unit of analysis matched the “big” size of those topics covered, 
focusing primarily on nation-states during critical junctures. 
 While most think of historical sociology as dealing with historical questions in 
the manner that the first and second waves dealt with them, historical sociology has 
evolved over time, created different logics of practice and has been used differently by 
different scholars (Lachmann 2013). This is best shown by the third and most recent 
wave of historical sociology. As Charrad states, the “third wave offers an opportunity to 
reexamine the core questions that preoccupied our predecessors and to ask new questions 
in regard to culture, agency, the character of modernity, gender, colonized peoples, race 
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and the world beyond the West” (2006: 352). This shift in historical sociology has 
opened it up to study a more versatile range of themes and processes that were not under 
the scope of the first two waves. The emergence of third wave does not discredit the first 
two waves but rather gives it an added breadth and depth to which this study belongs.  
Nevertheless, understanding the genealogy of historical sociology is not the same 
as understanding how to do historical sociology. I begin the next part of this thesis by 
discussing comparative-historical methodology and how it is implemented in this study to 
understand the factors that led INS to help undocumented immigrants during IRCA.  
This study, while not employing the comparative-historical method as classic 
studies have done (see Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979 and Charrad 2001 for examples), 
shares the logic and telos of the comparative-historical method. Comparative-historical 
analysis1 is characterized as “examining how long-term trajectories combine with short-
term developments at critical historical moments to lead to different political outcomes” 
(Charrad 2001: 10). This is done by selecting cases that are similar on multiple 
dimensions to isolate the dimension that is thought to be responsible for the change that 
occurred during the critical historical moment. For example, Charrad (2001) analyzes 
why Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (three countries with similar histories or “background 
variables”) had divergent forms of family law and gender equality/inequality after 
independence from France. The difference in these cases is that Tunisia had a strong 
central state in relation to kin groups during the pre-colonial and colonial era which 
1 I use “comparative-history,” “comparative-historical analysis” and “comparative-historical methodology” 
(or “methods” for short) interchangeably throughout this study, referring to the same methodology 
described in this section.  
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allowed the postcolonial state to pass improved legal status for women in Tunisia, while 
Algeria and Morocco had a weak central state in relation to the kin groups, causing both 
to eventually adopt a more conservative form of family law which lead to durable gender 
inequality.  
While it is impossible for comparative-historical analysis to gather large data sets 
or control for all possible variables, the goal of comparative-history is two-fold. Skocpol 
(2003) calls this two-fold goal in comparative-historical analysis a “doubly engaged 
social science” because it aims to examine evidence while building theory. This is the 
strength of comparative-history. In fact, this “approach makes possible a dialogue 
between theory and evidence of an intensity that is rare in quantitative social research” 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: 13). Having a small number of cases allows the 
researcher to know their cases intimately and also allows them to account for issues such 
as measurement validity, independence and applicability of theory across contexts – 
making “contextualized comparisons” (Locke and Thelen 1995). Comparing a case with 
other similar cases allows for many methodological and theoretical advantages, including 
the creation of higher-order theory – theory that can be applicable towards other cases 
through the use of comparisons.  
There are two ways that cases can be compared according to Mill (1950): the 
method of agreement and the method of difference. The method of agreement takes cases 
that share the phenomenon being studied to strengthen the theoretical argument. The 
method of difference contrasts cases in which the phenomenon being studied is present to 
cases in which it is absent. These comparisons are often done through the use of 
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“negative cases” – cases that have a divergent outcome to those being studied. The use of 
negative cases is seen as an advantage in comparative studies (whether it is comparative 
history, analogical theorizing and even ethnography) and is something that is desirable in 
order to “test” the proposed theory. By comparing a negative case to a positive case, we 
are able to determine the strength of the proposed hypothesis by seeing how it failed in 
one case and succeeded in another.  
This study will analyze one case, INS during IRCA’s legalization period, and 
compare it to the time periods before and after the legalization program began in 1987. 
The time period before the beginning of legalization that this study considers is 1970 to 
1986. This period is chosen because discussions of legalization and INS’ management 
issues began to surface during the early 1970’s until the passage of IRCA in 1986. The 
second time period ranges from 1988 to 2003. This time period is considered because it 
captures the success of INS after its implementation of the legalization program. The life-
span of the legalization program (May 1987 to May 1988) serves as the critical historical 
moment that separates the two periods of time. For the purposes of this study, the time 
periods before and after the legalization program serve as “negative” cases, meaning that 
INS did not take unprecedented measures to help undocumented immigrants during these 
periods. The legalization period serves as the “positive” case meaning that INS did take 
unprecedented measures in helping undocumented immigrants. By comparing the 
“positive” case to the two “negative” cases, the importance of INS’ desire to expand, 
INS’ discretionary power during IRCA and the legitimation crisis that it faced are 
highlighted to reveal why INS helped immigrants during IRCA.  
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Operationalization of Concepts   
Before discussing the data used in this study, it is useful to examine how some 
key concepts are utilized, especially the concepts of legitimacy and unprecedented 
measures. Without having a clear understanding of legitimacy or unprecedented 
measures, it will be difficult to analyze how INS suffered from the dual legitimacy crisis 
and then regained its legitimacy. Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (574). 
This definition is important because it focuses on the perceptional aspect of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy for Suchman is above all else a perception of the entity – it is socially 
constructed. It is a form of social capital, and, like all other forms of social capital, it is 
prescribed by other individuals, groups or institutions.  
This clarification is needed because this study diverges from standard studies of 
governmental legitimacy in that legitimacy is not conceptualized as the legality of the 
agency, but rather, the image or perception that Congress or undocumented immigrants 
have of INS. In other words, this study is not analyzing the legal legitimacy of INS 
(something that is unquestioned since Congress did not defunct INS during IRCA). I do 
argue that because INS’ standing with Congress was unfavorable before IRCA, it had to 
make sure to implement IRCA in a certain way to regain its standing with Congress. 
However, much more is at stake than just having a “bad image.” As with any social 
construction, the ramifications are tangible. Not being seen as competent by Congress 
would mean that INS would not be able to expand as it desired or attain an increase in its 
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budget. The lack of this “perceptional legitimacy,” then would have negative 
consequences on INS. Thus, the “legitimation crisis” can be solved and seen empirically 
when Congress grants more funds and power to INS, being seen as competent enough to 
use it. 
Secondly, I use “unprecedented measures” as a “catch-all” phrase for the actions 
that the INS would not normally do to help migrants with their legal status on a systemic 
level. While there were INS agents who were kind to immigrants and helped them in 
various ways, this was not the policy of the INS as an organization. However, 
unprecedented measures were implemented to be seen as a competent organization, 
which include the massive PR campaign INS created, their cooperation with community 
organizations, and the creation and efficiency of various legalization offices throughout 
the U.S. that were build from the ground up to help implement IRCA.   
 
Data 
 
This study is based on primary data such as congressional hearings, newspaper 
articles, public statements made by INS officials, Congressional members, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and other high ranking government officials, non-
governmental evaluations and secondary sources. The congressional hearings were 
collected via the ProQuest Congressional database. I searched the database for all 
documents relating to IRCA, INS and the implementation of IRCA by INS. After 
choosing the documents based on their titles (anything that said “immigration,” “IRCA” 
or “INS”), I read through the table of contents and read through any sections for relevant 
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material. Newspaper articles were collected in a similar manner using the ProQuest 
Historical Newspaper databases, particularly the New York Times, the Los Angeles 
Times and the Washington Post.  
The statements made by INS officials and other important players during IRCA 
were collected through the aforementioned sources along with interviews given to Lisa 
Magaña in her dissertation (1995) and her 2003 book. She interviewed Alan Nelson, the 
Federal Commissioner of the INS from 1982 to 1989, Harold Ezell, the Western Regional 
Commissioner of the INS from 1985 to 1988, Bill King, the Western Regional Manager 
of IRCA, Ernest Gustafason, the Los Angeles District Director of the INS from 1985 to 
1990, along with deputy directors in important posts during IRCA (Magaña 1995). The 
questions ranged from organizational discretion of INS employees on the ground to the 
higher level objectives of INS.  
Non-governmental evaluations refer to those made by independent immigration 
institutes that analyzed INS and its implementation of IRCA. These include studies by the 
RAND Corporation, the Urban Institute and the Migration Policy Institute. These studies 
were supplemented with governmental data taken from the 1980 and 1990 Census, the 
Department of Justice’s online archives and government documents such as publications 
from the GAO, DOJ and INS.  
Lastly, data on INS during IRCA is supplemented by secondary sources primarily 
composed of academic publications. The data for this study were collected through the 
University of Texas at Austin Library System databases, the Nettie Lee Benson Latin 
American Collection Library, and the Tarlton Law Library. The combination of the 
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methods, concepts and data are used to triangulate the motivations, actions and events of 
legalization in the U.S. during IRCA. 
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Chapter 3:  Background on IRCA and INS 
This chapter provides a history of the INS (its formation, duties and leadership) 
and IRCA (its beginnings at the state level, the political controversy behind legalization 
and employer sanctions and its signing into law). A brief overview of what previous 
scholars have said about INS and IRCA will also be included to see how this study fits 
into the larger body of work on the INS and IRCA. The purpose of this chapter is to get 
the reader acquainted with how INS functioned and existed before IRCA to understand 
its abilities and limitations. 
IRCA and INS in the Literature 
 The story of IRCA has been told and examined by the most respected scholars 
of immigration, leaving no shortage of literature on the topic. When thinking about the 
literature on IRCA, it is useful to do so it in terms of two thematic categories: IRCA’s 
formation from bill to policy and its social, economic and political impact - its creation 
and outcomes. The following is a review of these two major perspectives that have 
studied IRCA across various methodologies and theoretical frameworks.  
 The passage of IRCA from bill to law has been extensively covered by 
immigration scholars. Most notably, the works of Hing (2004), Kubat (1993) Gimpel 
(1999) and Maddux (2005) show how much of the debate around employer sanctions and 
legalization (the two highly contested and controversial provisions within IRCA) were 
first attempted at local levels (California), failed, and then attempted at the national level. 
These debates and processes are what culminated into IRCA in November 6, 1986 when 
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then-President Ronald Reagan signed IRCA into law (see below for a more detailed 
history of IRCA’s legislation).  
           A shift in how we understand how immigration control is produced came with 
Tichenor’s (2002) Dividing Lines. In this work, Tichenor advocates for a historical-
intuitionalist approach which aims to study how institutions (particularly, political 
parties) influence how immigration control is formed and ultimately passed into law. This 
allows Tichenor an advantage over other historical works on immigration policy because 
it avoids the individualist trap that is often associated with studying politicians as having 
total control of a historical moment. Instead of looking at one or two politicians that 
crafted a specific immigration bill (something that can at times be ahistorical), Tichenor’s 
analysis of the party system itself and its influence on policy necessitate that he provide a 
context and history that is often lost when studying individuals onto themselves. 
Moreover, studying institutions can help ground studies of the state. When studying 
“large” entities such as the State, History, and Processes, it is easy for theories to become 
so general that they ultimately become abstract and don’t speak to the reality of 
immigration. By studying institutions, Tichenor is able to reach a middle ground that is 
run by the politicians and is part of the state and its actions. This allows Tichenor to 
marry both the individual and the abstract, all while studying the elites who are 
responsible for shaping immigration policy. 
 Another thread of studies focused on the outcomes of IRCA. Many prominent 
immigration scholars in multiple disciplines (such as sociology, history and political 
science) have discussed how IRCA has affected migrants who benefited from amnesty as 
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well as how employers were affected by the sanctions imposed on them for hiring 
undocumented workers. For example, the work of Douglas Massey has explored how 
migrants and Latinos have faced discrimination in the hiring process after IRCA. His 
1999 article with Julie Phillips examines the effect of IRCA on immigrant’s wages 
(Phillips and Massey 1999). They find that IRCA did not increase discrimination against 
Mexican workers, but rather “encouraged greater discrimination against undocumented 
migrants” (233). Another study by Michael Crocenzi (1992) examines specifically the 
effect of employer sanctions on immigration trends in the U.S. from Mexico and Central 
America finding that the sanctions did not do enough to overturn the “pull” of migration. 
Other studies (Sorensen and Bean 1994; Taylor 1996; Taylor and Thilmany 1993; Donato 
and Massey 1993; Davila, Pagan and Grau 1998; Bansak and Raphael 1998) have all 
provided (much like the first two mentioned) an analysis of IRCA’s effect on wages, 
employer discrimination, migration flows, and the everyday lives of the migrants who are 
leaving their home countries for the U.S.  
           Both the historical studies and outcome studies of IRCA have provided an 
overview of how IRCA came to pass and affected both employers and immigrants, 
however, very few of these studies are given attention as to how IRCA was implemented. 
Even Tichenor’s work, which studies institutions, primarily focuses his analysis on 
Congress and their power to influence immigration laws forgetting the other actors that 
were important in how the law was applied. A study that diverges from this popular study 
of IRCA comes from Hagan and Gonzalez-Baker (1993). In their study, “Implementing 
the U.S. Legalization Program”, they conduct an ethnography in a Maya community 
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living in Houston, TX and originally from Guatemala. They study how immigrant 
communities, community-based organizations and INS officials all played a role in 
legalization during IRCA. An innovation that this study provides is its focus on 
organizations and how it describes some of the actions these organizations undertook 
during the legalization period. This study is important because its analysis of 
implementation gives us a glimpse of how IRCA functioned instead of a structural 
overview of what happened. 
Yet, as rich as the immigration literature on IRCA is, it does not help us 
understand why INS would help migrants as they did during IRCA. Studying INS’ role 
during IRCA will allow us to understand how groups or organizations that were once 
antagonistic toward one another can ultimately have their interests converge in order to 
produce legalization for millions of undocumented immigrants.  While neither INS nor 
IRCA stopped the flow of immigration as many scholars or politicians predicted, 
understanding why INS acted as it did can show how a paradoxical historical moment can 
be created, one in which an immigration service that was known to deport migrants was 
doing unanticipated actions to keep them in the country. 
INS: Formation and Administrative Change  
Immigration services in the United States have not changed often throughout 
history, but they have had occasional shifts in organization. Before the creation of 
immigration services, the Secretary of State was responsible for submitting immigration 
statistics to Congress. The U.S. created its first immigration office in 1864 in order to 
help produce immigration. A Commissioner of Immigration (under the State Department) 
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was created to regulate immigrants’ transportation and the settlement. This law, however, 
was not effective at handling immigration at the state level, so the Commissioner of 
Immigration was abolished four years later and immigration was left up to the individual 
states to regulate, while the Secretary of State resumed his duties of submitting 
immigration statistics. The U.S. began to reconsider this position in the 1870’s when the 
Supreme Court deemed that the Federal government should have exclusive regulation 
over immigration.  
In 1882, two laws were passed that began to change the landscape of immigration 
in the United States. Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act and the Immigration Act 
of 1882 that established the Federal government as the appropriate judiciary over 
immigration policy, established the grounds for exclusion of certain people (prostitutes 
and convicts) and gave the Treasury Secretary power to coordinate with various states for 
law enforcement to control immigration. The control of immigration by the Federal 
government took a step forward with the creation of the first organization, the Federal 
Bureau of Immigration, which was established in 1891 under the Department of 
Treasury. The Bureau of Immigration began with 24 inspection stations (the most famous 
being Ellis Island in 1982) at both seaports and land borders. These inspections sites 
would eventually become the influence of the Border Patrol of the 1980’s and today. 
Along with the “enforcement” of these various ports, Congress passed the Naturalization 
Act of 1906, adding the naturalization component to the immigration system (for a brief 
summary, see Table 3-1).  
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A new bureau was created in order to run the naturalization component named the 
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, which is the ancestor of the INS due to its 
dual mission of enforcement and naturalization. However, it ended after seven years 
when the two functions were separated in 1913 as a result of the separation between the 
Departments of Commerce and Labor. Enforcement and naturalization were maintained 
separated until 1933 when they were united again under the new formed Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) under the Labor Department. Finally, in 1940, the INS 
moved from the Labor Department to the Department of Justice, the last major move for 
an immigration agency in the U.S. until the INS was disbanded in 2003 and duties split 
up between three new government agencies: the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
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Services (USCIS), the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (DOJ 2003). In total, immigration services have 
been housed in 6 parent agencies and have taken the form of 9 different government 
agencies.  
INS: Leadership and Hierarchy during IRCA 
Dealing with immigration in the United States has been a contradictory practice 
for policymakers and the INS (Calavita 1992). Since the introduction of inspections sites 
in 1891, INS has had to deal with both welcoming some immigrants while denying 
others. The history of immigration from Mexico is a microcosm of the structural reality 
faced by INS – while they must protect the borders from undocumented immigration 
(enforcement) they also grant authorization to immigrants while realizing the importance 
of immigrant labor (naturalization).  
To serve these two conflicting missions, INS was composed of four regions 
nationally, with 4 regional service centers, 33 district offices and 20 sectors during IRCA 
(Magaña 1995). Alan Nelson served as the Federal Commissioner of the INS from 1982 
to 1989 (the time before, during, and after IRCA). His job was to oversee the four 
regional offices (Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western). Within the four regions, 
there are district offices that were responsible for IRCA’s implementation. Figure 3-1 
shows the hierarchical chain of command found within INS during IRCA.  
29 
30 
'JHVSF*/40SHBOJ[BUJPOBM$IBSU	.
BHB×B

           However, Nelson was also responsible for translating policy and INS’ objectives 
in every office (Magaña 1995). Once Congress passed new immigration policy, 
rules/regulations were developed by INS which described how the agency will implement 
the law. The Office of the Federal Register was the official government entity responsible 
for publishing all agency rules and regulations – the INS’ rules/regulations could be 
primarily found in Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), much like the three 
new agencies under the Department of Homeland Security (INS 2000). The general 
provisions of laws enacted by Congress are interpreted and implemented by regulations 
issued by various agencies, including INS. These regulations applied the law to daily 
situations and after the regulations are published in the Federal Register, they are 
collected and published in the Code of Federal Regulations, commonly referred to as the 
CFR (USCIS 2014).  
  Nelson, along with every other Commissioner of the INS, was delegated 
responsibility by the Attorney General to develop and publish changes to U.S. 
immigration rules and regulations found in the CFR. Yet, not every provision of law has 
to be supported by a federal regulation which allowed the Commissioner to prescribe 
rules and regulations as necessary or appropriate to carry out the functions of INS, with 
the only possibility of scrutiny coming from the Administrative Procedures Act (INS 
2000).   
 There are three forms of regulations that the Commissioner of INS could produce: 
proposed rules, interim rules, and final rules. Proposed rules are those documents that are 
published in the Federal Register that propose changes to the INS’ regulations in the CFR 
 31 
and request public comments on those suggested changes. In order to be in compliance 
with the Administrative Procedures Act, almost all documents should first be proposed 
rules. Interim rules on the other hand were usually reserved if there is a statutory or 
emergency requirement to issue regulations immediately. While interim rules do not go 
through the process that proposed rules undergoes, they have the same legal effect as 
final rules because both interim rules and final rules amend the CFR and have an 
effective start date. Still, interim rules are not permanent and must be issued in the form 
of a final rule if it is to stay in the CFR after it expires. Lastly, final rules are documents 
that formally change and/or amend the CFR by adding or removing sections or whole 
parts of the existing regulations. If there is a need to discuss or explain matters of general 
concern to the public, notices are published in the Federal Register – usually reserved to 
announce meetings and application submission dates, as in the case of IRCA. However, 
notices do not amend the CFR and are only used to notify the public (INS 2000). While 
the INS was under the influence of agencies and departments with more authority 
(Congress, DOJ, OMB, and GAO), they had the ability to control their regulations and 
ultimately, the implementation of laws passed by Congress.  
IRCA’s Legislative History 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act was the product of decades-long 
debates, testimony, political maneuvering, agendas, and concessions. The battle for IRCA 
began in the 1970’s with large numbers of Mexican workers migrating to the U.S. This 
also coincided with the wave of Central Americans who migrated due to political strife in 
their home counties. These two waves of immigration presented a problem to the Reagan 
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administration in the midst of a recession, especially since this wave of immigration was 
seen to be driven by economic motivations (Massey, Durand & Malone 2002; Hing 
2004). Because economics was viewed as the primary motivation for immigration, the 
Reagan administration keyed on employer sanctions as the solution. 
Employer sanctions, however, was not a novel idea created by the Reagan 
administration. Its origins stem in the 1950’s, when the U.S. sought to impose sanctions 
on business to cut down on immigrants from antagonistic countries. However, this bill 
was quickly defeated because it would hurt businesses by preventing them from using 
immigrant labor. Employer sanctions would not be brought up again until the early 
1970’s when the House passed two bills that wanted to implement employer sanctions. 
Any traction for this legislation, however, would fail to leave the Senate. In 1975, 
President Gerald Ford would create a cabinet-level committee that recommended the 
three provisions that would eventually become IRCA: employer sanctions, enhanced 
border enforcement and legalization for undocumented immigrants (Gonzalez-Baker 
1990).  
During the Carter administration, these three ideas would be highly debated by 
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCRIP), a committee 
created by Congress to provide recommendations on the immigration situation. SCRIP’s 
recommendations would be the basis of debate during the Regan years, taking the three 
essential propositions created during the Ford years and adding a more detailed and 
complete picture on potential immigration policy, such as the requirements for 
legalization, the implementation of immigration policy and the timing of legalization. 
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Nevertheless, the specter of employers being punished still made many members of 
Congress uneasy, especially as the U.S. was entering the neoliberal era of Reagan – 
which naturally led to the many debates in the 1980’s about requirements for legalization. 
The influence of SCRIP moved beyond the debates surrounding the details 
regarding legalization and employer sanctions – it also brought the House and Senate to 
hold joint hearings on immigration for the first time since the 1950’s (Baker-Gonzalez 
1990). This led to two bills on immigration, one by the Reagan administration titled the 
Omnibus Immigration Control Act and the other by the joint hearings authored by 
Senator Alan Simpson (R.-WY) and Representative Roman Mazzoli (D.-KY) – the bill 
known as the Simpson-Mazzoli act or the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1982 
(IRCA). However, despite the momentum that immigration policy was gaining in both 
chambers of Congress and with the Reagan administration, the House would pose a 
problem when it came time to vote. There would be no new immigration policy in 1982.  
The next years saw more of the same: IRCA would easily pass the Senate but 
would always fail to garner the votes in the House. The bill would be weighed down by 
hundreds of amendments and protracted debates on the House floor, all revolving around 
the requirements for legalization with some debates surrounding employer sanctions. It 
wouldn’t be until 1985 when a group of congressman (notably, Peter Rodino, Charles 
Schumer and Pete Wilson) introduced ideas of a guest-worker program that would 
become the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program that allowed IRCA to pass 
(Baker-Gonzalez 1990). IRCA passed the House on October 15, 1986 and was signed 
into law by Reagan on November 6, 1986. 
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The passage of IRCA was considered by many a small miracle due to the highly 
contested debates that occurred on the House floor. While many were still skeptical if 
IRCA’s philosophy was enough to curtail immigration, a bigger concern was on the 
horizon: trusting INS to implement IRCA. While it cannot be proven that IRCA in its 
perfect form and ideally implemented would have prevented waves of immigration, one 
thing was sure: INS would have to be better than it had been before to execute it. This, 
however, was not the perception of INS before IRCA was passed as we will see in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 4:  The INS’ Image Crisis 
The quote that opens this study speaks to how the GAO and other powerful 
institutions perceived INS – as “the ugly stepchild of the Justice Department.” While this 
could be dismissed as the opinion of one person, there were many more reports 
expressing the dissatisfaction with the job INS was doing and how it dealt with 
immigration. Perhaps immigration was too difficult a task for any one agency to maintain 
and control by itself. However, this did not stop the GAO, Congress, community 
organizations and undocumented immigrants themselves from thinking that INS was 
poorly managed and “in a hopeless state of disarray” (Morris 1985: 88). In this chapter, I 
will outline how different agencies and organizations that were higher ranking or had 
major influence (such as the GAO, Congress, and the media) all went on record as to 
express the INS’ incompetence when it came to management, budgeting and performing 
its duties. This comprises the first segment of this chapter which I call “Troubled 
Perceptions from Above.”  
The second half of this chapter will focus on how undocumented immigrants and 
community groups (both groups that INS did not give much attention to before IRCA) 
negatively viewed INS in the section titled “Troubled Perceptions from Below.” This 
chapter is the first step in understanding why INS took unprecedented measures to 
implement legalization for undocumented immigrants during IRCA and how INS went 
from being the loathed immigration service to the aid of immigrants during IRCA. 
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Troubled Perceptions from Above: GAO, OMB and Congress 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) is not well-known in the public 
consciousness, but it is in the consciousness of agencies. The GAO (known now as the 
General Accountability Office) is an agency that works for Congress, often called the 
“congressional watchdog” (GAO 2014). Its primary duty is to monitor and investigate 
how the government spends taxpayer dollars. Therefore, the reports and 
recommendations made by the GAO to Congress are important for other government 
agencies because the GAO helps determine where funds get used. In the most recent 
fiscal year, the GAO saved $51.5 billion dollars of tax funds or about $100 for every 
dollar invested in the GAO (GAO 2014). However, while the GAO saves money, there 
are agencies that are losing out on that money – meaning that agencies hope to be 
evaluated positively by it. Moreover, about 80 percent of all recommendations made by 
the GAO to congress had been implemented (GAO 2014). Due to the GAO’s influential 
relationship, it would benefit the financial interests of government agencies to get high 
recommendations from the GAO. 
Unfortunately for INS, the GAO did not publish many positive reports about 
them. Before IRCA became law in 1986, GAO published two reports, one titled Need for 
Improvement in Management Activities of INS (1977), and another named Prospects Dim 
for effectively Enforcing Immigration Laws (1980), in which GAO painted a “grim 
picture of the [INS] – showing it to be inadequately equipped, overwhelmed by its work, 
deeply demoralized, and in a hopeless state of disarray” (Morris 1985: 88). However, the 
most critical and comprehensive report on the management problems faced by INS would 
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come later. The GAO published a report formally condemning the INS’ leadership and 
operations. In this report, GAO states that “over the past decade [the 1980’s] weak 
management systems and inconsistent leadership have allowed serious problems to go 
unsolved… Without coherent overall direction and basic management reforms, the 
organization has been unable to effectively address changing enforcement responsibilities 
and longstanding service delivery problems” (GAO 1991: 91). When discussing INS’ use 
of money, the GAO had reported the INS’ “lack of accountability has allowed managers 
to dramatically overspend budgets and disregard federal fiscal policy… The key to 
achieving program success and reordering priorities are sound financial management and 
budget systems. INS has neither” (GAO 1991: 9). The report continues by saying that the 
INS is incapable of reforming its financial situation without the help of the Attorney 
General, the Director of the OMB (Office of Management and Budget) and a group of 
“top experts from other federal agencies and the private sector” (GAO 1991: 9). Due to 
the severe budgetary problems that the INS suffered from, the GAO did not believe that it 
could resolve them on its own and recommended the aid of financial experts to help with 
the INS’ dire problems. In fact, the GAO reported in 1980 that the “INS resources 
devoted to preventing illegal entry and reducing the number of illegal aliens will not 
change significantly for quite some time” (GAO 1980: 5).  
The dire state of INS’ budget problems was not confined to the findings from 
these GAO reports on management but also extended to their poor use of budget. In 
March of 1986, months before IRCA became law, GAO published another report that 
accused INS of violating federal regulations, specifically for awarding a computer 
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contract to IBM for $61.3 million under illegal circumstances. The violations stem from 
the contract, which was manipulated by INS officials, after a late-night meeting between 
them and IBM executives after IBM and Electric Data Systems (EDS) gave their “best 
and final offers (GAO 1986: 11). According to the report, IBM’s best and final offer was 
reduced by $3.3 million, making it $2,713 lower than the EDS’ offer (GAO 1986: 2). In 
addition to violating how government contracts are negotiated, INS later accepted 
changes to IBM’s offer which altered the size and configuration of the system on which 
the award was originally made (GAO 1986: 2). According to the report, this increased 
INS’ computing capability fourfold and increased the contract cost to $11 million more 
than the amount authorized by the DPA – only authorizing a twofold increase in their 
computer capability. The new contract total also exceeded $100 million, a clear 
budgetary violation under established regulation. GAO also charged INS with several 
other violations outside of meeting after negotiations were closed and spending more than 
what they were authorized to spend, including non-compliance with the Financial 
Integrity Act, not evaluating IBM’s and EDS’ payment plans equally, applying technical 
criteria inconsistently, and accelerating the delivery dates in the contract to circumvent 
the bid protest and civil actions (GAO 1986).  
The GAO was not the only powerful agency that did not believe in INS. The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was another agency that thought INS had 
major problems in its operations and budgets. The OMB is the largest office in the 
Executive Office to the President, with the director being a member of the President’s 
Cabinet. The core mission of the OMB is to help the President implement his vision and 
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to measure the quality of agencies so that they comply with the President’s policies 
(OMB 2014). The OMB has five primary goals:  
 
1.  Budget development and execution, a significant government-wide process 
managed from the Executive Office of the President and a mechanism by which a 
President implements decisions, policies, priorities, and actions in all areas (from 
economic recovery to health care to energy policy to national security); 
   
2.  Management — oversight of agency performance, Federal procurement, financial 
management, and information/IT (including paperwork reduction, privacy, and 
security); 
   
3. Coordination and review of all significant Federal regulations by executive 
agencies, to reflect Presidential priorities and to ensure that economic and other 
impacts are assessed as part of regulatory decision-making, along with review and 
assessment of information collection requests; 
   
4. Legislative clearance and coordination (review and clearance of all agency 
communications with Congress, including testimony and draft bills) to ensure 
consistency of agency legislative views and proposals with Presidential policy; 
and 
   
5.  Executive Orders and Presidential Memoranda to agency heads and officials, the 
mechanisms by which the President directs specific government-wide actions by 
Executive Branch officials. (OMB 2014).  
 
This, along with the sheer size of the OMB makes it a very important governing and 
overseeing agency. While Congress was ultimately in charge of controlling INS’ 
budgetary requests, the OMB controlled INS’ budget requests to Congress and reflected 
the administration’s thinking (Morris 1985). We gain insight from a report by the 
Brookings Institution, stating that the OMB “has consistently slashed INS and requests 
for increased funds, arguing that administrative and policy changes were required before 
any significant infusion of new funds [could be considered]” (Morris 1985: 130). It 
continues by saying that after “drastically reducing the Justice Department budget 
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recommendations to increase the INS budget and personnel in fiscal year 1980 [six years 
before IRCA], an OMB budget examiner said as much to a study team of the House 
Government Operations Committee…” (Morris 1985: 130). This OMB budget examiner 
“complained that the agency [INS] put too much emphasis on enforcement and too little 
on service” (Morris 1985: 130) leading him to say that “in the future, OMB is going to 
place more attention into the service aspects of INS and place the INS enforcement 
responsibilities in a holding pattern (House of Representatives 1980: 80-81).  
The OMB’s analysis and recommendation of the INS was an important one: favor 
service over enforcement. The OMB’s budgetary support resided in INS’ ability to 
promote service more efficiently – something that we saw INS work hard towards during 
IRCA (see chapter 5). However, neither the OMB nor the GAO was the INS’ biggest 
concern – their biggest concern being Congress, the group that ultimately controls INS’ 
budget and the potential to expand.  
Much like the GAO and the OMB, Congress also felt that INS was a flawed 
government agency that did not deserve an increased budget. According to the Brookings 
Institutions, “Congress [had] also been reluctant to approve large new allocations for the 
INS, mainly because of what it perceives to be major administrative problems at the INS. 
Indeed, after appropriating $3.7 million in fiscal year 1980 to automate the INS district 
offices, Congress halted the effort because INS officials had failed to plan the 
undertaking appropriately” (Morris 1985: 131). This was a recurring theme for the INS – 
they would get an opportunity to receive or spend additional money, but they would 
squander the opportunity due to poor management, as seen with the IMB incident and the  
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$3.7 million appropriated to them in 1980. Table 4-1 shows the discrepancy between the 
budget requested by the INS and the Congressional appropriation it was granted.  In this 
table, we see that from 1969-1976, Congress either gave Congress exactly the amount it 
Fiscal Year  INS Request
2 Congressional 
Appropriation
3
Percentage Change Over 
Previous Year’s 
Appropriation  
1969 87.8 87.3 - 
1970 94.9 94.6 2.5 
1971 112.9 112.4 14.5 
1972 130.6 130.6 12.9 
1973 135.1 135.1 -2.8 
1974 143.3 143.3 -4.9 
1975 184.1 175.9 13.6 
1976 209.7 208.0 12.5 
1977 221.6 234.0 6.0 
1978 256.3 266.5 6.2 
1979 298.0 309.3 4.8 
1980 304.4 318.5 -10.5 
1981 347.7 351.0 -0.2 
1982 363.4 446.5 21.1 
1983 524.6 488.9 6.3 
1984 512.6 501.3 N/A 
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asked for (fiscal years 1971-1974), or less than the amount it asked for (1969-1971; 
1975-1976).  
Yet, we see the INS’ budget increase dramatically from 1969 to 1984, from $87.3 
million to just over $500 million. From 1977-1982, the INS experienced a period in its 
history that saw Congress grant it more than what the INS requested. While the raw 
numbers suggest that the INS was not suffering a legitimation crisis before IRCA, but 
instead, enjoyed an extended period of success, an in-depth analysis of INS’ budget 
shows otherwise. The growth of the budget from 1969 to 1984 is attributed to two things 
outside of the INS’ perceived excellence. Although the table adjusts the percent change 
over the previous year’s appropriation for inflation, the raw dollar amounts are not 
adjusted, meaning that the increases in budget are largely due to inflation (Morris 1985). 
This coupled with an overall increase in government spending account for any increases 
in INS’ budget. The Brookings Institution underscores this in their report, writing that the 
“real budget increase have been modest increments… due in large part to inflation and 
the overall increase in government spending during this period” (Morris: 1985: 132).  
If budgetary concerns were not enough, Congressional opinions of INS’ ability to 
perform its duties were very negative. For example, Representative Joshua Eliberg (a 
representative from Pennsylvania who was the chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Naturalization, and International Law of the House Judiciary Committee, 
once said that “the INS at the present time [1977] is totally incapable of administering 
and enforcing provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act [the most important law 
on immigration for the U.S. that was in affect then and today]” (U.S. Congress 1977: 
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444). This was followed up by his successor to the chairmanship, Representative 
Elizabeth Holtzman, stating that the INS “still uses 19th century tools” whose “record 
system… is a disaster” and lacks “professionalism” (New York Times, January 17, 
1980). This opinion of INS was not tied to the two chairman of the immigration 
subcommittee. According to the Brookings Institution, “[o]ther members of Congress… 
have all painted a similarly grim picture of the agency – showing it to be inadequately 
equipped, overwhelmed by its work, deeply demoralized, and in a hopeless state of 
disarray” (Morris 1985: 88).  
Troubled Perceptions from Below: Immigrant Advocacy Groups and 
Undocumented Immigrants 
 
  The primary argument of this study is that because the INS was facing a 
legitimation crisis (its standing before Congress and other parent agencies was 
unfavorable before IRCA) it had to make sure to implement IRCA in a certain way to 
regain its standing with Congress. That “certain way” involved working with immigrant 
advocacy groups (such as churches, lawyers, and community organizations) and gaining 
the trust of undocumented immigrants in order to successfully implement the legalization 
portion of IRCA – or naturalization as the OMB called it in their recommendation to the 
INS before IRCA passed. However, wanting to obey the wishes of Congress, GAO and 
OMB and implementing them are two separate things, especially when we consider that 
immigrants and advocacy groups did not trust INS. This section outlines immigrants’ and 
advocacy groups’ negative perception of the INS.  
 44 
 While it is impossible to universalize any group’s opinion about any topic, the 
relationship between immigration agencies and immigrants and their allies create a 
dichotomy, one in which neither side thinks highly of the other. For immigrants and 
community groups, their encounters with INS were conflictive, causing the distrust that 
INS needed to overcome. However, the circumstances that led to immigrants’ distrust of 
INS were not unwarranted given some of the actions INS undertook in deporting 
immigrants.  
For example, one of the most ethically problematic actions that INS used before 
the passage of IRCA was using the children of immigrants to ensnare their undocumented 
parents. News stories revolving around the use of this method circulated in various news 
outlets. In a story by the Washington Post, the newspaper wrote about two Salvadoran 
teenagers being released from INS detention after refugee advocates protested their use as 
“lures” for undocumented immigrant parents. The General Counsel for the National 
Center for Immigrants’ Rights declared that “They [INS] are just trying to force the 
parents to come in” (Washington Post, July 20, 1985). A similar story reported by the Los 
Angeles Times stated that a class-action lawsuit was filed against the INS, charging it 
with detaining “The children of thousands of illegal aliens… and used as “bait” to capture 
parents” (quoted in Los Angeles Times, July 11, 1985). This lawsuit was brought forward 
by the aforementioned National Center for Immigrants’ Rights in conjunction with the 
American Civil Liberties Union.  
 INS would vehemently deny these allegations however. One of the most 
controversial INS leaders – Harold Ezell, the Western Regional INS Commissioner – 
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would be a prominent voice in denying the use of children as lures, stating that INS did 
not want to contribute “to an already growing problem of child abuse” (quoted in 
Washington Post, July 20, 1985). While it is difficult to track if and how the INS used 
children to lure their parents and the precise effect that it had on immigrants and 
advocacy groups, the distrust of the INS can be simple to understand and seen in manifest 
ways, like in the form of lawsuits (Washington Post, July 20, 1985).  
Prominent INS officials like Ezell did not help to sooth this distrust. In a 1986 
news report (months before IRCA was signed into law), Ezell was on record saying that 
“I don’t believe the average congressman or senator in Washington has a clue to what 
really is happening with the invasion of this nation with illegal aliens – every day” 
(quoted in Washington Post, March 24, 1986; emphasis mine). In this same report, he 
denounced “sanctuary cities” – cities that take measures to protect undocumented 
immigrants, both by law and social practice, such as preventing the police from inquiring 
about people’s legal status – as provocative and illegal. He continued by saying that “[i]f 
the capital of this nation was out on the bluff overlooking that soccer field south of San 
Diego, we would have had immigration reform many years ago” – implying that the 
Latinos playing soccer are all undocumented and something should be done about it. A 
Los Angeles City Council member said of Ezell “I don’t think there has ever been a 
federal appointee before who used such hate and innuendo to arouse the community” 
(quoted in Washington Post, March 24, 1986).  
 The image problem that the INS faced is also chronicled by Hing (2004: 175), 
particularly as it pertains to Ezell. He writes 
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The image problem was exemplified by Harold Ezell, controversial INS regional 
commissioner for the western region, home of most anticipated applicants [for 
IRCA]. Prior to the passage of IRCA, Ezell was an outspoken opponent of 
“illegal” immigrants. He often invited television crews to the scene of INS 
workplace raids that he himself attended, and frequently charged that 
undocumented workers took jobs from Americans while exploiting the welfare 
system. While Ezell was apparently never personally involved in the physical 
mistreatment of aliens, he epitomized INS enforcement and symbolized the worst 
type of INS abuse of undocumented workers. Even his friends and church got into 
the act, helping establish a vigilante-type border watch group called Americans 
for Border control. Ezell’s verbal attacks on Mexican migrants particularly ignited 
the ire of the Latino community, and stirred several spokespersons to call for his 
firing.  
 
Stories like the ones of children being used as lures, workplace raids, and stereotypical 
statements about immigrants made by high ranking INS officials made the INS a difficult 
agency to trust for advocacy groups and especially immigrant groups. This is why 
advocacy groups advised immigrants to “avoid the INS” when IRCA was on the cusp of 
becoming law (LA Times, October 24, 1986) and why the number of immigrants 
applying for legalization was initially low (Hing 2004). Even the INS itself recognized 
this fact. Sam Sinclair, the man hired by the INS to organize the publicity campaign 
during IRCA, was quoted as saying that INS “knew there would be a certain amount of 
the ‘fear factor’. The Border Patrol, they’re the cops” and legalization was thought to be 
another sting operation (quoted in Cosco 1988: 18). This meant that the only way for the 
INS to implement the legalization component of IRCA (one that would help it regain its 
standing before Congress and the other parent agencies) was to develop trust between 
itself and undocumented immigrants (see chapter 5).  
This is evident by statements made by INS officials themselves. In interviews 
done by Magaña (2003) – which included then-Federal Commissioner Alan Nelson and 
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the controversial Harold Ezell – she finds that “[a]ll INS respondents [I interviewed] felt 
that legalization rather than sanctions was given first priority… For example, the head 
legalization officer in Los Angeles told me, “The aliens could really benefit from this 
program, and it was a chance to change the image of the agency”” (42; emphasis mine). 
According to Magaña, Ernest Gustafson (the Los Angeles District Director during IRCA) 
stated “that one of the most important nonstatutory objectives of legalization was to 
establish good rapport with the Spanish-speaking community” (45). There is little doubt 
that the INS was aware of this problem, and knew that it must be fixed if IRCA was to be 
successfully implemented.  
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Chapter 5:  Becoming El Amigo and Regaining Legitimacy 
 Feeling pressure from Congress, the GAO and OMB along with being distrusted 
by the immigrants and their advocacy groups placed the INS in a precarious position. 
Even with IRCA providing an opportunity to prove itself, it faced an enormous challenge. 
Aside from the monumental task of having to get the trust of immigrants and work in 
conjunction with advocacy and other community groups, the INS was caught off guard 
with its new duties. Even though IRCA had been in the consciousness of Congress, INS 
and the public for the entire 1980’s, its passage was somewhat of a surprise, being signed 
into law by Reagan in November of 1986. IRCA’s legalization provision would thus 
begin on May of 1987, giving the INS a mere six months to get ready to serve millions of 
people.  This put the INS in a bind, having the final regulations finalized on May 1, 1987, 
four days before “the doors to legalization opened” (Hing: 1992: 426). Despite this, INS 
would put forth an effort that exceeded the expectations of Congress, immigrant 
advocacy groups and the immigrants themselves.  
 The first part of this chapter will focus on the actions taken by INS during IRCA 
that ultimately won over the trust of undocumented immigrants. Specifically, this chapter 
will outline the massive public outreach/public relations campaign that was undertaken 
and the creation of Legalization Offices (LOs). The second part of this chapter will show 
the effectiveness of these strategies and how INS not only gained the trust of immigrants 
and advocacy groups (enough to implement the legalization provision), but also achieved 
its higher goal of changing its perception in the minds of Congress, GAO and OMB, 
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allowing it to enjoy a period of expansion that followed IRCA – the ultimate goal for the 
INS.  
Befriending Immigrants: The PR Campaign, Establishing Legalization Offices and 
Creating a New Image 
 
Gaining the trust of immigrants would not be an easy task for INS – it would take 
a rebranding and reconfiguration of its actions and image. One of the biggest concerns at 
the beginning of IRCA was that no immigrants would voluntarily go to INS to get the 
legalization process started. As shown in Chapter 4, INS recognized that undocumented 
immigrants would view the legalization program as just another sting operation (Cosco 
1988: 18). This meant that the INS would have to work on changing that perception of 
immigrants.  
One of the ways that the INS would do this is by embarking in an unprecedented 
publicity campaign to help ease the minds of immigrants. Sam Sinclair, the director of the 
Portland office of Cole & Weber Public relations who was in charge of the INS publicity 
campaign, said that “[t]he INS had never done a heavy public relations campaign, and 
had never gotten into the advertising side… In fact, the armed forces is the only 
government entity that routinely conducts such broad-based programs” (16). This public 
campaign would be important in the efforts to befriend immigrants. Their coalitions with 
community groups and establishment of effective legalization offices would be in vain if 
they could not help to curve their negative image in the beginning stages of IRCA.  
This meant that every INS official, staff member and employee would have to 
participate in the campaign in one way or another. One of the most shocking participants 
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was Harold Ezell, the man who televised INS workplace raids and established a vigilante 
border watch group with his friend and church. Ezell, along with Ernest Gustafson (the 
Los Angeles district director) and a popular Spanish-speaking radio disk jockey known as 
El Tigre (The Tiger) embarked on a “massive public relations campaign on television and 
radio and at community events throughout Los Angeles” (Magaña 2003: 44). This group 
would go on to call itself El Trio Amnestio (The Amnesty Trio), which had such a broad 
impact on the immigrant consciousness that Ezell stated “that almost ten years after the 
media campaign he was still recognized by immigrants” (44). This was due in large part 
to the time commitment that Ezell put forth. Doris Meissner (a former INS official during 
IRCA and creator of a critical Carnegie report on the INS) reported that Ezell “had the 
throttle out fully for the whole year – 18 hours a day, seven days a week” (quoted in 
Cosco 1988: 20). Even the biggest enemy of undocumented immigrants was out 
promoting legalization.  
A very well known-event that El Trio Amnestio embarked on was a weekly event 
called “Thursday Night Live” in which LOs opened and advertised legalization (Hing 
1992: 435). These events placed a heavy emphasis on community activities and staged 
events to help spread the word. Other creative advertisements included stuffing reminders 
of the programs into 580,000 packages of tortillas from an area factory (which generated 
wide news coverage, including a mention on the Tonight Show with Johnny Carson), a 
song named “Amnestia” to commemorate IRCA’s legalization program, amnesty buttons 
and balloons handed out at INS offices that read “Amnesty Day” and Amnesty Month”, 
town meetings, amnesty fairs, Boy Scouts sending flyers to low-income neighborhoods, 
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INS floats and information booths at different holiday celebrations, PSAs and other 
television ads of success stories from immigrants who received their permanent-resident 
cards (20). The media campaign was very successful in getting its message across, 
particularly as it pertains to addressing Latino immigrants – “La Migra… now had a 
smiling face” (20). The INS was very much dedicated to this effort, to the extent that at 
one point during IRCA, 25 to 30 percent of staff was allocated to the public campaign 
(Hing 2004: 178).  
A second important way that INS sought to combat its negative image was to 
create Legalization Offices (LOs) – a place where applicants could turn in their 
applications, be interviewed or have the applications renewed (Meissner & Papademtriou 
1988; Baker 1990). The LOs handled most of the day-to-day work along with Regional 
Processing Facilities – or RPFs as they were known which were in charge of reviewing 
LOs recommendations, granted and denied applications and on occasion conducted 
investigations (Hing 1992). However, getting workers and training them during this time 
would be difficult. The LOs along with most of the legalization apparatus was completely 
new, making it difficult to recruit, hire and train 2,000 new workers in six months (427). 
In total, the INS opened 107 legalization offices and 4 regional processing facilities, one 
for each of the regional districts of the INS found in the 4 major regions. (U.S. Congress 
1988: 157).  
Still, the hiring of LO staff on a short notice was not the most difficult task for the 
INS – it would be getting migrants to trust them enough to seek their help for 
legalization. The INS feared that the LOs would be seen as synonymous with their 
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deportation image and their enforcement history. This posed one of the biggest early 
challenges for the INS: finding locations to help immigrants. One of the tactical 
maneuvers made by the INS was to place the LOs away from any of the INS’ main 
offices (433). What also helped was that the offices were located in “bright, well-supplied 
buildings away from the [usual] gray facilities” and staffed with “cheerful, courteous INS 
retirees and non-INS temporary workers” in an attempt to portray the message: “This 
office isn’t the same one you’ve been afraid of” (Cosco 1988: 19). During the training of 
LO staff, workers were reminded that “IRCA [was intended] to be applied generously 
applied and emphasized that employees were to help immigrants how they could qualify” 
(Hing 2004: 173). 
 In addition, staff was to treat immigrants fairly, opening interviews with 
immigrants by saying “I’m here to help you with your application today” to show 
immigrants that LO offices were different from the INS’ enforcement image (173). Much 
of the success with the LOs relied on this staff, comprising of people who were 
sympathetic to amnesty and to helping immigrants (173). The trust gained by the LOs 
showed in the appraisal they received from community groups. Catholic Social Services 
lauded the INS and LO offices stating that the INS had created a new image of 
“openness, reasonableness and cooperativeness”, and going as far as praising the INS for 
the “apparent non-issue of mistrust” (quoted in Meissner & Papademetriou 1988: 73).  
The LOs did an effective job at helping reshape the image of INS. It transformed 
the “negative connection that immigrants initially made between the INS and its LOs 
[which] proved beneficial to the entire INS in the long run” (Hing 2004: 177). A report 
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sponsored by Carnegie noted that “Senior INS officials have been accessible and have 
earned respect that helped break down what some have called the ‘circle of fear’ 
surrounding the INS… [This is due to] the personal effort and commitment given by 
many INS officials [which] is reshaping the agency’s image in the public eye” (quoted in 
Cosco 1988: 47). More than breaking the “circle of fear,” the INS was able to become el 
amigo of immigrants. Hing (2004: 178) writes, 
The legalization program represented a completely “new ballgame”… 
Neighborhood LO’s worked. There were no uniformed Border Patrol officers at 
LOs, and the offices were described by many as open, clean, friendly, and 
accessible places. The “new look” image of the INS – amicable and service-
oriented – made a big difference. Local outreach by LOs and district personnel 
was unprecedented. The LOs’ attempt to reach out into the immigrant community 
was massive and inventive; for a period of time, 25 to 30 percent of all district 
staff were allocated to personal public appearances… the INS could claim to be 
the friend of undocumented immigrants.  
 
Despite many doubts of the INS’ ability to gain the trust of immigrants, the combination 
of the public relations campaign and the success of its LOs allowed the INS to become 
the friend, el amigo, of undocumented immigrants. While many consulted private lawyers 
and advocacy groups, it is estimated that 71% of all applications were processed by LOs 
and that “most applicants went directly to the LO for information and filing” (174). Still, 
becoming the friends with immigrants was not the endgame for the INS – gaining 
credibility in order to expand was the ultimate end. These efforts would be for naught if 
they were unable to achieve that goal. Fortunately for the INS, it was lauded by not only 
immigrants and community groups, but also by Congress and the GAO. 
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Praise from Above: The Relegitimization of the INS 
           After the dust settled on IRCA and the legalization program ended, many reports 
and evaluations from entities that once criticized INS began to come out. The GAO stated 
in a report that “[a]s of May 1990 INS had processed over 3 million requests for 
legalization under IRCA. Also, INS’ handling of the amnesty program, despite short time 
frames for implementation and numerous problems, has received good marks from both 
INS critics and supporters” (GAO 1991: 18). The GAO was amongst those INS critics 
who gave them good marks for their work during legalization. They produced three 
reports with their evaluation of INS (GAO 1987; 1988; 1990). While there was an 
emphasis on employer sanctions (the other major provision of IRCA), they praised the 
implementation of IRCA by INS stating that the “GAO found that the law… has 
generally been carried out satisfactory by INS” (GAO 1990: 3). This is especially high 
praise coming from an agency that produced multiple reports outlining the INS’ poor 
management.  
           The GAO also reported to Congress its positive opinion of the INS during IRCA at 
a Congressional Hearing whose theme was to discuss the implementation of IRCA. This 
Congressional Hearing, named “The Implementation of Immigration Reform” (1988), 
was carried out a few weeks before the legalization program was to end. At this hearing, 
Arnold Jones (the Senior Associate Director of the GAO) presented the GAO’s 
assessment to Congress. Jones comments on the success of the public relations campaign, 
stating that “[i]n our opinion, INS is making a good faith effort to publicize the 
legalization program” (162) which resulted in “[a]wareness of the legalization program 
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[being] high among Hispanics, according to a study that addressed program awareness” 
(159). He continues by saying that the INS has handled the financial side of the 
legalization program well – “[a]s of March 1988, INS had spent about $150 million and 
had collected $176.2 million in fees… INS projects that the total fees that it will receive 
by the end of the application period (May 4, 1988) will cover all of the program-related 
costs. Should this not occur, INS will adjust the fee aliens pay when they apply for 
permanent resident status” (165). This is a reversal from the IBM contract scandal that 
occurred two years prior to this hearing and the management critiques that the INS had 
been receiving since the 1970’s.  
           However, the GAO’s positive evaluation of the INS after IRCA would mean little 
if Congress did not see the INS as successful. Fortunately for the INS, Congress also had 
many positive things to say about the implementation of the legalization program. 
Senator Alan Simpson, one of the architects of IRCA, stated in an early review of IRCA 
that “the INS is to be commended” for its efforts during IRCA (U.S. Congress 1987: 3). 
Another portion of this hearing was dedicated to praising the INS in a section named 
“INS TO BE COMPLIMENTED,” that states that “the INS should be complimented for 
the work they have done, for they have recognized the complexity. They have done 
something unique in my knowledge in handling legalization” (16). During this same 
congressional hearing, the Chamber of Commerce stated: “We commend the Immigration 
and Naturalization (INS) for its openness and willingness to listen to our concerns and 
their efforts to address concerns within the constraints of the statute and its budget. It is 
our view that many of the problems of this law result from the statutory language, not the 
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implementation efforts, per se, of the INS” (22). Even Senator Edward Kennedy, a vocal 
opponent of the INS and the Chairman during the evaluation of IRCA, had praise towards 
the INS. In his opening statement, Kennedy stated that “[m]uch has happened since then 
[since the last congressional hearing the year before], and most of it good. Thanks to the 
hard work of the immigration officers and voluntary and church agencies, over 1.5 
million people have come forward to apply for amnesty” (U.S. Congress 1988: 1). In 
another setting outside of Congress, Kennedy also said that during IRCA, “[t]here was a 
great openness and real pride [in INS]. There was an esprit de corps there that was 
impressive” (Cosco 1988: 19).  
          Another telling moment during these congressional hearings occurred when the 
Federal Commissioner, Alan Nelson, boasted what he perceived was the INS’ success 
and received no refutation from Congressional members. In the 1988 congressional 
hearing, he states: “I think it is fair to say, as I believe both of you [Senators Kennedy and 
Simpson] have alluded to, that this bill has worked, and I think the Congress should be 
proud of its efforts in passing IRCA. I think the administration can rightly be proud of 
how we [INS] have implemented it” (U.S. Congress 1988: 18). Just a few years prior, 
during a congressional hearing surrounding the IBM contract, Nelson was repeatedly shot 
down by Senators and the GAO during a budget hearing for the INS (U.S. Congress 
1986). This would completely change as a confident Nelson happily reminded Congress 
of INS’ success. In other hearings, Nelson would tout the INS’ implementation of 
legalization without debate. In 1989, during an IRCA oversight hearing he stated in 
regards to legalization: “The results speak for themselves… The bottom line, 3.1 million 
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applicants.  I  think  if you go back over  the  years, not many people predicted  that many 
would come forward, either that there weren’t that many there or they would be afraid to 
come  forward  or  INS  would  use  it  as  a  scam.  None  of  the  negatives  turned  out,  the 
positives did… We’re in a 1­year program and we did six times what everybody in the 
world did” (U.S. Congress 1989: 392).  
           Nelson would make  claims  like  this  throughout  every  congressional  hearing  on 
IRCA  and  the  INS’  budget. What  helped was  that  experts who  gave  testimony  during 
these  hearings  would  praise  the  efforts  made  by  the  INS,  even  after  it  was  clear  that 
IRCA could not curtail  the  flow of undocumented  immigration  from Mexico and Latin 
America.  Still,  the  consensus,  as  summarized  above,  regarding  IRCA  was  that  “the 
problems of this law result from the statutory language, not the implementation efforts.”    
           This was reflected in the budget for the INS over the rest of its history (see Table 
5­1).  The  INS’  budget  would  increase  from  $1  billion  in  the  years  after  IRCA,  to  $6 
billion. A  another  increase  in  seen  in  the  number  of  positions  held  by  INS,  anywhere 
from 17,000 to 18,000 during IRCA and the time following IRCA to 37,000 in the final 
year of the INS’ existence. While there are many reasons for this increase (the passage of 
enforcement style immigration laws like the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act  (IIRIRA)  and  the  drug war  at  the  border),  trusting  the  INS  to  be  a 
player  and  recipient  of  these  funds  was  never  a  given  –  especially  in  the  time  period 
before IRCA. In fact, a major debate in  the 1988 congressional hearing (which focused 
on the INS’ performance during IRCA and budget discussions) surrounded the role that 
the INS should play in the drug war occurring at the border. We must remember  that  the  
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INS’ perceived ability  to  take on difficult  challenges  and  tasks was  a problem  that  the 
INS  faced.  However,  IRCA  provided  the  opportunity  to  show  that  INS  management 
could  implement  the  wishes  of  Congress  competently.  While  other  structural  and 
Table 5­1: Immigration and Naturalization Service's Budget, 1975­2003 (DOJ Archive) 
FISCAL  
YEAR  POSITIONS 
INS BUDGET 
(Millions) 
CPI INDEXED 
TO 1993 
INS 
BUDGET 
IN 1993 $ 
(Millions) 
INS BUDGET 
REAL PERCENT 
GROWTH 
FROM 1993 
INS BUDGET 
APPARENT PERCENT 
GROWTH 
FROM 1993 
                          
1975  8,082    $181.3    37.4    $484.7    ­68.4    ­88.2    
1976  8,832    214.6    39.6    542.5    ­64.6    ­86.0    
1977  9,473    244.5    42.1    580.6    ­62.1    ­84.1    
1978  10,071    283.1    45.3    624.4    ­59.3    ­81.5    
1979  10,997    309.3    50.4    613.2    ­60.0    ­79.8    
1980  10,943    349.1    57.3    609.6    ­60.2    ­77.2    
1981  10,886    371.5    63.2    587.8    ­61.7    ­75.8    
1982  10,604    444.4    67.1    662.5    ­56.8    ­71.0    
1983  10,483    495.7    69.2    715.9    ­53.3    ­67.7    
1984  10,601    510.6    72.2    707.4    ­53.9    ­66.7    
1985  11,649    585.0    74.8    782.5    ­49.0    ­61.8    
1986  11,694    574.7    76.2    754.2    ­50.8    ­62.5    
1987  17,544    902.5    79.0    1,142.6    ­25.5    ­41.1    
1988  17,742    1,010.3    82.1    1,229.9    ­19.8    ­34.1    
1989  18,505    1,085.3    85.9    1,263.1    ­17.6    ­29.2    
1990  17,010    1,183.5    91.2    1,298.3    ­15.3    ­22.8    
1991  17,187    1,270.5    94.5    1,344.0    ­12.3    ­17.1    
1992  17,676    1,458.5    97.4    1,497.8    ­2.3    ­4.9    
1993  18,417    1,533.3    100.0    1,533.3    0.0    0.0    
1994  18,622    1,586.2    103.0    1,540.0    0.4    3.5    
1995  21,048    2,158.7    105.6    2,044.7    33.4    40.8    
1996  24,704    2,600.2    108.7    2,391.2    55.9    69.6    
1997  26,123    3,132.7    111.1    2,818.8    83.8    104.3    
1998  29,349    3,688.2    112.8    3,269.7    113.2    140.5    
1999  31,502    4,001.7    115.7    3,457.7    125.5    161.0    
2000  32,187    4,277.3    119.8    3,570.8    132.9    179.0    
2001  33,990    4,902.0    122.9    3,988.6    160.1    219.7    
2002  37,698    6,208.2    125.1    4,962.1    223.6    304.9   
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historical  circumstances  helped  the  INS  increase  its  budget,  its managerial  competence 
during IRCA showed Congress  that  it could be trusted with a bigger budget, one that  it 
received. 
Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
INS, IRCA and the Convergence of Interests 
Amongst the many worries of Congress when drafting IRCA was how a policy, 
no matter how perfectly crafted, would be implemented. As chapter 4 showed, there were 
many concerns surrounding the INS during the decade prior to IRCA’s signing in 1986. 
Serious questions about INS’ management, leadership and budgetary maintenance left 
Congress, GAO, the OMB, immigrant advocacy groups and undocumented immigrants 
skeptical of how well legalization would be implemented. This background is important 
to understand why and how the INS helped undocumented immigrants attain legalization. 
We discover three important variables that led to the INS’ actions during IRCA. 
The first, the INS’ desire to expand, is built into the DNA of the INS and other 
government agencies as shown in the literature (Browne 1980) but is also found 
empirically through the INS’ numerous budget requests that demanded more money each 
year (Morris 1984). The second, the INS’ discretionary power during IRCA, also proved 
to be important. While much of the literature on government agencies is focused on the 
subordination of the agencies to Congress, discretion exists even for agencies like INS. 
This was evident in how they approached legalization - many of the actions they took 
were not written into law (U.S. Congress 1988). However, this discretion needed to exist 
in the first place for the INS to implement its own provisions to help immigrants.  
The last component is the legitimation crisis that INS was facing from Congress 
(and wanting to change its perception in the eyes of Congress) – the most important of 
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the dimensions and driving force behind the INS’ actions. This was seen in the numerous 
testimonies, studies, reports, congressional hearings and newspaper articles denouncing 
INS. However, it is this pressure from Congress that ultimately led to the INS’ 
extraordinary and unprecedented measures during IRCA. While it may seem like a 
hypocritical move for people like Harold Ezell to fight for IRCA’s passage into law and 
to be one of the people working to befriend immigrants during IRCA, it makes sense 
when we think about its end goal. If expansion is something that is highly desired by an 
organization, then it is logical for it to engage in behavior otherwise avoided in order to 
gain something. It is true that there were many individuals that were interested in helping 
migrants, as seen in the Legalization Offices. However, this was not the main goal of 
INS. As I have shown, the INS was going through a dual legitimation crisis from both 
“above” (Congress, the Department of Justice, Government Accountability Office, etc.) 
and “below” (undocumented migrants). This meant that it had to be seen as trustworthy 
in the eyes of their foil, undocumented immigrants, which led them to the massive PR 
campaign, rebranding of their image and transforming itself from la migra to el amigo, 
all in the name of going from “the ugly stepchild of the DOJ” to an agency that would see 
its budget more than double in the next years (Department of Justice Online Archive).  
The reformed image of INS would not last very long though (Cosco 1988). It 
would go back to its workplace raids, using children as lures and even tricking 
undocumented immigrants into coming to INS offices to “claim citizenship” (LA Times 
1992). What’s more, prominent INS officials returned to their normal behaviors. Again 
taking Ezell as an example, he showed that much like IRCA, his concern for immigrants 
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only lasted a year. While he was an advocate for IRCA and tried to show he was a friend 
of immigrants, he was a co-author to 1994’s Proposition 187 in California – one of the 
most anti-immigrant legislations in U.S. history. Prop 197 sponsored a state-run 
citizenship screening system and prohibited undocumented immigrants from being able 
to participate in public education, health care and other social services. The law would 
later be found to be unconstitutional.  
Contemporary Relevance for the Literature  
This study is concerned with the power of legitimacy and the convergence of 
interests that create paradoxical historical moments, even though those moments may not 
last forever. While IRCA itself represented and fostered a benevolent climate for 
immigrants, the discretionary dimension is impossible to overlook. Should the INS had 
been in a position of strength during IRCA, this study argues that legalization would have 
had a different outcome in the U.S. However, since history did not occur in that manner, 
we see how an agency can regain its legitimacy: by being innovative in its actions (the 
PR campaign, legalization offices), becoming validated locally (at each LO), the 
diffusion of this validation (advertisements and word-of-mouth spreading) and general 
validation (acceptance of INS as doing a good job during IRCA). The process for re-
legitimation is similar to the process for legitimacy. However, an agency or organization 
must start “from scratch” and create something innovative or new in order gain 
legitimacy, something that is not always possible.  
Moreover, the case of the INS during IRCA also shows the power that 
“illegitimate” audiences can have. It is logical that undocumented immigrants do not 
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normally have power, just as the peasant classes during social revolutions do not always 
have transformative power (Skocpol 1979). Still, during critical historical moments, the 
role and agency of immigrants matter. While it may seem counterintuitive for immigrants 
to pass up on legalizations, seemingly against their interests, it is not unprecedented 
(Levinson 2005). With this in mind, undocumented immigrants’ participation was key if 
legalization in the U.S. was to be successful and for the INS to regain its standing before 
Congress. While undocumented immigrants and other marginalized groups are often left 
in precarious positions due to structural forces, their agency and importance cannot be 
overlooked, particularly when a group, institution or society is faced with a historical 
moment, moments where we focus on the big and powerful, but should also pay attention 
to those in the periphery.  
Directions for Future Research  
  While the claims made by this study are supported by empirical evidence, there is 
more than can and should be analyzed. Chapter 2 outlines the most pressing need for this 
study: the need to compare across cases. In order to see the applicability of the theories 
purported here, particularly those on legitimacy, legitimacy crises and re-legitimation, it 
must be tested in other contexts.  
 Two potential cases have been identified: France’s immigration service, Office 
des Migrations Internationales (Office of International Migration or OMI), during their 
regularization1 that lasted from July 1981 to February 1983 and Italy’s immigration 
service, Dipartimento per le libertà civili e l'immigrazione (The Department for Civil 
1 Legalization is known as “regularisation” amongst European countries. 
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Liberties and Immigration or DCLI) during their 1986 Regularization Program. If a 
comparison is to be made, attention should be given to how they reacted to legalization 
policy when it was passed in their respective countries and how they differed from the 
INS in relation to the measures they took. Specifically, comparing the outcomes of each 
case (how they helped immigrants during regularisation) to one another to see if there are 
any similarities or differences in the explanatory variables. In France, the OMI was 
successful in advertising its regularisation program, much like the INS (Levinson 2005: 
79), while in Italy, there was little publicity to support the program (78). Thus, a future 
study should test the dimensions found in the INS cases in Italy and France during their 
regularisation periods.    
Another important test for this study’s validity is the consideration of more data to 
test for alternative hypotheses. Again, while this study and its claims are supported by 
data, a more in-depth analysis of all INS budgets, congressional hearings, newspaper 
articles, independent evaluations and secondary sources could be used to strengthen the 
argument, either to provide more data in support or to alter the theory to better represent 
reality. Part of this data analysis will revolve around the analysis of the French and Italian 
cases, which could highlight or dismiss different parts of the INS case. Moreover, 
analyzing the two cases will strengthen not only the empirical and theoretical components 
of this study, but also the methodological, allowing it to slide towards a more robust 
comparative-historical method.  
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A Final Thought  
 If immigration reform passes in the future, there is an outline for how to treat 
immigrants. The years 2012 and 2013 were years of hope for undocumented immigrants 
with Barak Obama’s executive order in 2012 (named Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA), which allows those who are under 31 as of June 15, 2012 to gain 
certain rights) and the passage of S.744 in the Senate in 2013 (a law seen as the 
grandchild of IRCA by many). However, both are ultimately not enough to please the 
U.S. government or undocumented immigrants because DACA can be revoked by the 
next president and S.744 failed to pass in the House of Representatives. Still, there are 
many things we can learn from the IRCA experience. 
While the first thing that jumps to the mind of scholars and commentators alike 
when thinking of IRCA is its failure to curve undocumented immigration, they overlook 
an important fact: it is possible for an immigration service to treat immigrants humanely. 
Instead of using IRCA as a means to trick immigrants into deportation, it was used to 
give many of them an escape from poverty and difficult lives. While it is naïve to think 
that an immigration service would help immigrants in the manner that the INS helped 
immigrants during IRCA, providing the proper incentives can produce this relationship 
and avoid the tragedies of family separation, protracted detainment and deaths at the 
border. It was a refreshing sight to see the INS show an innovative side and implement 
legalization successfully while become the friend of immigrants for IRCA’s one year 
period to many. However, in the end, undocumented immigrants are not seeking to make 
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friends with immigrations services, but rather, to be treated humanely whether it includes 
“documented” status or not. 
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